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Introduction 
As soon as a possible worldwide spread of a new Influenza A virus was announced, Belgian 
health authorities decided to intervene in order to delay the spread of the new virus in the 
population (1,2).  
The delaying strategy started on 26 April 2009 based on a systematic case finding of Influ-
enza A(H1N1)2009 in travellers returning from affected areas and their contacts for the 
purpose of taking individual control measures.  
From 13 July onwards, the Interministerial Influenza Coordination Committee announced the 
switch to a mitigation phase (1). This required appropriate surveillance of influenza-like ill-
nesses. The sentinel general practitioners (SGPs) network for seasonal influenza was 
reinforced and took over the systematic case finding system (3). 
We report on the enhanced case-based surveillance of the first cases of Influenza 
A(H1N1)2009 up to 13 July 2009 and the subsequent mitigation phase till the start (3 Octo-
ber 2009) of the classical seasonal flu period. 
Method 
A procedure for case and contact management was adapted from the existing preparedness 
plan for Influenza A/H5N1. Case finding was based on the case definition for possible cases 
that included clinical and epidemiological criteria. An enlargement to a definition for a sus-
pected case was made in order to allow sampling among patients who did not meet all 
criteria.  
The case finding procedure was communicated to medical doctors and made available on 
the dedicated reference website (www.influenza.be). 
During the containment phase, each suspected case was notified by the medical doctor to 
the health inspector of the respective region. Together with the medical epidemiologist on 
call of the Scientific Institute of Public Health (WIV-ISP), the decision was made to take or 
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not to take a sample. Sample kits and questionnaires were made available to all clinical labo-
ratories and if necessary, immediately delivered to general practitioners by the National 
Centre for Influenza (NIC) of WIV-ISP (4), where samples were analysed daily. Each day, the 
medical doctor on call at the former Epidemiology Unit of the WIV-ISP informed the prescrib-
ers and brought all epidemiological information together with final diagnoses in order to 
inform health authorities allowing them to take protective measures according to the proce-
dure.  
During the mitigation phase, the SGP network was enhanced in order to gather the neces-
sary information allowing the epidemiological follow-up, leaving again individual diagnosis 
based on clinical picture only. However individual laboratory diagnoses were still performed 
by the NIC, as by others labs where the diagnose capacity was delocalised, responding to 
the time needed for adaptation from one strategy to another or to the necessity in some 
cases to have a confirmed diagnose (e.g. pregnant women, chronically ill patients, patients 
with unfavourable evolution). This information was still gathered and integrated in the weekly 
report to health authorities. During the mitigation phase, considering that the virus was circu-
lating in Belgium, the epidemiological criterion of travelling to an affected area was removed 
from the case definition. A possible case was therefore based on clinical criteria only. 
Results 
From 26 April (week 17) up to 3 October 2009 (week 40), samples of 875 patients were 
tested in the lab. According to the Influenza Preparedness Plan, only patients fulfilling criteria 
for a possible case should have been selected for laboratory testing. The fact that only 38% 
of patients tested complied with the definition of a possible case, indicates that the recruit-
ment of cases for lab testing was not specific.  
From 26 April to 13 July 2009 (containment phase), 123 (20%) out of 614 collected samples 
from suspected Influenza A(H1N1)2009 cases were confirmed by RT-PCR while from 14 
July up to end September 2009 (mitigation phase) a similar proportion of 50 patients (19%) 
were diagnosed as Influenza A(H1N1)2009 cases among 261 tests performed (Figure 1).  
Seasonal flu also affected 16 cases, including 15 Influenza A(H3N2) virus and 1 Influenza B 
virus (1.8% of tested patients) and among them, 15 were identified during the containment 
phase. 
In Belgium, the first positive case of Influenza A(H1N1)2009 was identified from a sample 
taken on 12 May during week 20. After 8 weeks a total of 123 positive cases for Influenza 
A(H1N1)2009 were laboratory confirmed in Belgium. The official number of cases for this pe-
riod reached 126 patients since one case was registered by the SGP network and two cases 
remained probable cases. These two symptomatic cases were close contacts of confirmed 
cases but no samples were taken for laboratory confirmation because the patients were 
young children. 





























Figure 1. Number of lab tests by week and by result, week 17-40, 2009, Belgium.  
Other influenza includes the unsubtyped influenza A samples 
A peak was observed in week 28 when cases related to two outbreaks were detected with 13 
confirmed cases among participants of a rock festival in Werchter (5) and 15 confirmed 
cases from a language summer school. Afterwards a constant and low viral activity was ob-
served during the summer holiday period.  
The first death was reported in week 30 and the second one in week 38, both during the 
mitigation period. For both phases, 176 cases were diagnosed as Influenza A(H1N1)2009 
and among them males were more affected than females (sex ratio (M/F)= 1.5). The median 
age of the Influenza A(H1N1)2009 cases was 21 years (range 1-59), significantly lower 
(p<0.01) than the median age among tested patients (32 years) and still lower than the me-
dian age for seasonal influenza affected patients (41 years). 
Figure 2. Number of lab tests per 100,000, by age group and by result, week 17-40, 2009, Belgium. Other influ-
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The detection rate of Influenza A(H1N1)2009 in Belgium between week 17 and 40 was about 
1.6 cases by 100,000 inhabitants. The most affected age group by Influenza A(H1N1)2009 
was 15-24 years (Figure 2) with 4.7 confirmed cases per 100,000. No reported cases were 
older than 59 years. 
The majority of cases were residents of the provinces Antwerp (Antwerpen), Flemish Brabant 
(Vlaams-Brabant) and the Brussels-Capital Region (Table 1). Except in the Brussels Region, 
a decrease of the number of tests and of the incidence of Influenza A(H1N1)2009 was ob-
served between the two phases. During the second phase the highest incidence remained in 
the province of Antwerp and the Brussels Region; both with densely and internationally popu-
lated cities. 
Table 1. Number of probable and confirmed cases and other results of lab tests, proportion by 100,000 inhabi-
tants, by province, week 17-40/2009, Belgium 











FLANDERS 108 15 367 490 8,0 1,8 
     Antwerpen 47 5 111 163 9,6 2,8 
     Limburg 5 1 43 49 6,0 0,6 
     Oost-Vlaanderen 16 5 85 106 7,6 1,1 
     Vlaams-Brabant 33 2 84 119 11,3 3,1 
     West-Vlaanderen 7 2 44 53 4,6 0,6 
WALLONIA 45 12 203 260 7,6 1,3 
     Brabant wallon 6 1 35 42 11,3 1,6 
     Hainaut 16 5 73 94 7,3 1,2 
     Liège 13 2 54 69 6,6 1,2 
     Luxembourg 3 3 17 23 8,8 1,1 
     Namur 7 1 24 32 6,9 1,5 
BRUSSELS 23 4 94 121 11,7 2,2 
Unknown 0 0 4 4   
Total 176 31 668 875 8,3 1,7 
During the containment phase clinical criteria included fever > 38°C, myalgia or general dis-
comfort and cough together with an epidemiological link. Once the circulation of the 
pandemic virus has been demonstrated in the Belgium population, the epidemiological link 
was not required anymore to classify a suspected patient as a possible case. As the lab 
questionnaire was not modified, this information was still mentioned in 77% of the lab ques-
tionnaires.  
About 78% of the patients had fever, cough and myalgia. Dyspnoea was mentioned by 26% 
of the confirmed cases. About 30% of the confirmed cases mentioned an associated symp-
tom and the most frequent ones were diarrhoea, possibly associated with nausea (11%), and 
sore throat (7%).  
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The classification of all patients following the criteria of the possible case definition allows 
calculating the sensitivity (76.4%; 95% CI 68.5-82.9) and specificity (64.5%; 95% CI 60.5-
68.4) of the case definition. If the consequent positive predictive value is quite low, this result 
offered a negative predictive value of 91.8% (95% CI 88.6-94.2). 
In both phases the most frequent epidemiological link was related to travel in an endemic 
area. The proportion of positive Influenza A(H1N1)2009 was lower among the ‘travel related’ 
compared with people coming into ‘contact with case’ or involved in an ‘outbreak’ (Table 2) 
and the proportion is unchanged between both phases.  
Table 2. Repartition of the number of tests and results by type of risk, week 17-40/2009, Belgium 
  A(H1N1)2009 Other or un-
subtyped 
Influenza A 
Negative Tests % 
A(H1N1)2009
Travel-related 88 29 392 509 17,3 
Contact with case 21 1 33 55 38,2 
Outbreak Werchter 13 0 29 42 31,0 
Outbreak school 15 1 3 19 78,9 
No risk 4 0 22 26 15,4 
Unknown 35 0 189 224 15,6 
Total 176 3 668 875 20,1 
The country associated with the risk differed nevertheless according to the evolution of the 
pandemic (Figure 3). During the containment phase, suspected and possible cases returned 
mainly from North America (35%) while this place of travel was related in only 2% of the sus-
pected or possible cases during the mitigation phase. During the latter, suspected cases 
were mainly associated with travel within Europe or had not travelled. Two peaks in the num-
ber of tests in people who did not travel were associated in time with the two outbreaks. 
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Suspected patients included in the screening returned from more than 50 different countries 
of all continents. Most of them returned from North America (24.6%), followed by Europe 
(22.4%). About 50 tests were performed for patients back from Mexico none of them was 
positive for Influenza A(H1N1)2009.  
Discussion 
Following the detection of a new Influenza virus in April 2009, Belgium carried out the Influ-
enza Preparedness Plan in order to limit the possible health impact of such a threat. 
Measures associated with a delaying strategy were implemented in a first phase. The case 
finding during this phase allowed to implement control measures and was also a useful 
source for surveillance purposes. 
When facing such an event, with so many uncertainties, the reality in the field imposes to 
adapt some decisions taken in a Preparedness Plan. For surveillance purposes, we soon 
needed to accept that patients, who did not meet all inclusion criteria of a possible patient, 
were nevertheless sampled.  
Considering the specificity of the case definition, clinical criteria together with epidemiological 
features indicate that we can be confident about using it to detect most of the potentially in-
fected patients. Nevertheless, considering the transmission way and the possible clinical 
expressions of an influenza virus, the early detection of any patient seems to be utopia. This 
reality should be used to adapt control measures put in place in a delaying strategy following 
the severity of the new virus.  
The epidemiology of the initial cases of Influenza A(H1N1)2009 in Belgium was similar to that 
seen in other countries (6-22).  
Most infections with influenza A(H1N1)2009 that occurred in the first period were found in 
returning travellers. Week 28 was a turning point in the Belgian epidemiology due to 2 local 
outbreaks related to places where people from various countries participated in a rock festi-
val and a summer language school. The increasing number of cases at that time induced the 
change in strategy, going from containment phase to mitigation phase. Once the mitigation 
phase initiated (week 29), the SGP network with integrated epidemiological and virological 
surveillance has proven particularly valuable in following the spread of the epidemic as it also 
allows the follow-up of the relative contribution of the different circulating influenza strains (3). 
Even though the lab diagnosis was not required anymore, samples were still regularly sent to 
the NIC. These data demonstrated a similar proportion of positive results to the one in the 
containment phase, indicating that the virus was not circulating more in week 29 than in 
week 40. This observation raised the question of the real impact of the containment strategy 
and also highlighted that control measures should be adapted once the severity of a new in-
fluenza virus is known. 
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As in many other countries, the Influenza A(H1N1)2009 pandemic strain became the pre-
dominant circulating influenza virus within a few weeks of its appearance (6-22). During the 
mitigation phase, only one seasonal influenza virus was notified.  
Some population groups appear more vulnerable to Influenza A(H1N1)2009 pandemic infec-
tions than others. The shift in age distribution towards younger age groups, including 
younger adults and children, compared to seasonal influenza, confirmed previously de-
scribed data (23-25). Data suggest that the elderly may to some extent be protected from 
infection (26). The observed shift in age-specific infectivity patterns should influence vaccina-
tion priorities (29). The finding of pre-existing antibodies in the elderly, the reduced immune 
response because of immune senescence in the elderly and greater transmission among 
children, has prompted the recommendation to include younger age groups for pandemic 
vaccination (27-29).  
In Belgium, the holidays for all schools lasted from 1 July until 31 August. There is some evi-
dence that the start of school holidays reduces influenza transmission and that the return to 
school slightly accelerates the epidemic (30). This hypothesis requires further in-depth analy-
sis.  
The potential impact of pandemics and the occurrence of multiple waves of pandemics in the 
20th century underline the importance of active real-time surveillance on a global scale. In-
ternational collaboration is crucial for the effective exchange of virological, clinical and 
epidemiological data that will make possible the development of vaccines and treatment pro-
tocols and the identification of the best population-based control strategies.  
The current epidemic was a national, European and worldwide challenge demonstrating the 
need in continuous surveillance, fluid collaboration in term of exchange of information and 
strong coordination in order to facilitate expertise-based decisions.  
Conclusions 
Data from this and previous pandemics should provide useful insights for future planning. 
The efficacy of case finding in such a potentially large and long threat should be evaluated 
and lessons learnt be optimally used in the frame of the development of further control strate-
gies taking also into account the added value of a European approach. 
Facing a potential nationwide public health threat, it was also an enriching experience in 
which a lot of partners of public health have worked together in a coordinated way. The 
smooth collaboration between infectious disease control officers, medical epidemiologists, 
lab collaborators and last but not least, health care workers was the major asset in demon-
strating our capacity to tackle new and yet undefined health threats in the future. 
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